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DRUG COURIER PROFILES AND
THE INFRINGEMENT OF
FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
In 1974, the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA")
developed the "drug courier profile."1 The profile is aptly described
as "an informally compiled abstract of characteristics thought typical
of persons carrying illicit drugs."2 The profile has been used
increasingly to investigate commercial air travelers suspected of
transporting illegal drugs? In the first decade since its inception, the
profile was involved in approximately one hundred and seventy-five
reported judicial opinions." The profile consists of seven primary
characteristics:
(1) arrival from or departure to an identified source
city; (2) carrying little or no luggage, or large
quantities of empty suitcases; (3) unusual itinerary,
such as a rapid turnaround time for a very lengthy
airplane trip; (4) use of an alias; (5) carrying
unusually large amounts of currency in the many
thousands of dollars, usually on their person, in
briefcases or bags; (6) purchasing airline tickets with
a large amount of small denomination currency; and
(7) unusual nervousness beyond that ordinarily
exhibited by passengers?
Additionally, the profile consists of four secondary characteristics:
1 Morgan Cloud, Search and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug Courier Profile and
Judicial Review of Investigative Formulas, 65 B.U. L. REV. 843, 847 (1985). Profiles are
not used solely to identify drug couriers, nor are profiles limited to airports.
Border patrols use profiles to identify vehicles carrying illegal aliens. See United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). State troopers use profiles to stop the
flow of drugs via interstate highways. See State v. Johnson, 561 So. 2d 1139 (Fla.
1990). Local vice squads use profiles to detect men seeking to secure the services
of prostitutes. See City of St. Paul v. Uber, 450 N.W.2d 623 (Minn. 1990).
2 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 n.6 (1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
- Cloud, supra note 1, at 844.
4 Id.
- United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979).
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"(1) the almost exclusive use of public transportation, particularly
taxicabs, in departing from the airport; (2) immediately making a
telephone call after deplaning; (3) leaving a false or fictitious call-
back telephone number with the airline being utilized; and (4)
excessively frequent travel to source or distribution cities."6
Travelers exhibiting these characteristics are often stopped and
searched for illegal drugs.7
When relying upon the profile, DEA agents typically station
themselves in airports to observe passengers arriving from and
departing for source or distribution cities.' The agents concentrate
on passengers who appear nervous or have a "funny look."'
Passengers with this appearance are deemed to be suspects. Agents
then attempt to discover as much as possible about the suspect
without actual confrontation."0 For example, an agent may position
him/herself in line behind a suspect in an attempt to discover
whether the suspect has any luggage, his/her method of payment
and his/her turnaround time."
Upon confronting a suspect, agents initially ask to see a
suspect's ticket and identification.12 Agents always attempt to give
the suspect the impression that s/he is free to leave at any time.'3
6 Id.
7 Cloud, supra note 1, at 848.
sAn empirical study of 203 reported drug courier profile cases, performed by
Professor Cloud, indicates that the DEA considers Ft. Lauderdale, Miami, Los
Angeles, New York, West Palm Beach, Seattle, Chicago, Dallas, San Diego, Atlanta,
Detroit, and Charlotte to be source cities. Cloud, supra note 1, at 901. The original
Markonni source cities were Los Angeles, Miami, New York, and Detroit. Nancy
Hollander & Gary Nelson, In Search of a Reasonable Suspicion on the Road to
California: Stops, Searches and Seizures and the "Drug Courier Profile," 15 SEARCH AND
SEIZURE L. REP. 1, 17 n.2 (1988). The Cloud study suggests that Atlanta, Detroit,
Chicago, Washington D.C., New York, New Orleans, Boston, San Francisco,
Charlotte, Seattle, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, and San Diego are the distribution
cities. Cloud, supra note 1, at 902. This has led one court to wonder whether there
is any major city in the country "[w~hich a DEA agent will not characterize as a
major narcotics distribution center or a city through which drug couriers pass on
their way to a major narcotics distribution center." United States v. Andrews, 600
F.2d 563, 567 (6th Cir. 1979).
9 Phillip S. Greene & Brian W. Wice, The Drug Enforcement Administration Drug
Courier Profile: History and Analysis, 22 S. TEX. L.J. 261, 271 (1981).
10 Id. at 272.
11 Id.
12 Id.
"' Id. at 273.
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If a suspect agrees to be questioned, an agent will ask permission to
search the suspect and/or his/her luggage.'4 As long as a suspect
voluntarily consents, an agent is free to continue the investigation"
and discover more profile characteristics.'6
Terry v. Ohio17 is often cited as permitting law enforcement
officers to perform brief investigatory stops without a search warrant,
if the officers have a reasonable suspicion that the individual is
involved in criminal activity. 8 Law enforcement officers claim that
the drug courier profile characteristics provide the reasonable
suspicion required under Terry and that airport stops based on
profile characteristics do not violate a suspect's Fourth Amendment
rights. 9 In United States v. Sokolow,'0 the Supreme Court held that
behavior which matches drug courier profile characteristics, when
considered within the "totality of the circumstances,"' satisfies the
reasonable suspicion mandated by the Fourth Amendment before a
suspect may be stopped. ' This Note will discuss the Fourth
Amendment considerations, the impact of the Sokolow decision, and
the resulting erosion of Fourth Amendment rights in the context of
the use of the drug courier profile.
'
4 This is crucial because a "consent to search... would later validate the entire
chain of events - even if the agent did not have a founded suspicion and the initial
detention were illegal." Greene & Wice, supra note 9, at 271, 273.
s Cloud, supra note 1, at 849.
16 Charles L. Becton, The Drug Courier Profile: "All Seems Infected That Th' Infected
Spy, As All Looks Yellow to the Jaundic'd Eye," 65 N.C. L. REV. 417, 428 (1978). Subtle
pressure is exerted on the suspect to encourage him/her to consent to a search.
The suspect is frequently led to a small room somewhere in the airport and told
that if s/he does not consent, the agent will obtain a search warrant. Greene &
Wice, supra note 9, at 273. Sometimes a nonconsenting suspect is told that if s/he
does not consent, s/he is free to leave, but without his/her bags. Id.
17 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry will be discussed fully infra notes 27-48 and
accompanying text.
'8 Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
19 Id. at 30; see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 568 (1980) (White,
J., dissenting) ("[The Government sought to justify the stop by arguing that Ms.
Mendenhall's behavior had given rise to reasonable suspicion because it was
consistent with portions of the so-called 'drug courier profile' .....
20 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S 213, 230 (1983).
22 Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7.
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I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND INVESTIGATORY STOPS
The Fourth Amendment protects the public from
unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.'z A
warrant and a showing of probable cause that contraband is present
are the standard prerequisites of reasonable searches.24 Evidence
seized in an unreasonable search and seizure is suppressed and may
not be used against the defendant in his/her criminal trial.' The
Supreme Court, however, has carved out various exceptions to the
warrant and probable cause requirements.' The Court in Terry v.
Ohio authorized one such exception.'
A. Reasonable Suspicion
A Cleveland detective in plain clothes watched as Terry
walked a short distance along a downtown street, peered into a store
window, walked on a little further and then returned to confer with
a companion.' The companion then did the same.' The two men
23 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrant shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24 Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (the required probable cause could be
replaced by reasonable suspicion where it is necessary to take swift measures to
discover the true facts and neutralize the threat of harm). The Court has described
probable cause as "only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal
activity." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (citations omitted).
' This is known as the exclusionary rule. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
389 (1914).
' In the following situations, the Fourth Amendment does not require a
warrant for a search: (1) consent to search is given by the parties to be searched,
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); (2) exigent circumstances which
demand immediate action, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); (3) weapons or
contraband are in plain view, Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); (4) a search
that is conducted incident to a lawful arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969).
27 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
s Id. at 6. The detective was unable to say what initially drew his attention to
Terry and his companion. The detective had never seen them before and had no
information that a robbery was about to be committed. The suspects "just didn't
repeated this ritual at least a dozen times.' From his thirty years
of experience patrolling downtown for shoplifters and pickpockets,31
the detective believed that the men were "casing" the store in
preparation for a robbery.32 He watched for ten minutes more
before confronting the men and identifying himself as a police
officer.' Because the suspects mumbled in response to his
questions, the detective grabbed Terry, spun him around and patted
down the outside of his clothing.' In his search, he discovered a
revolver in Terry's pocket.'
At trial, Terry moved to suppress admission of the gun,
claiming that it was found as a result of an illegal search and
seizure.3 The Common Pleas Court, Cuyahoga County denied the
motion.37 Based upon the detective's years of experience, the court
determined that he had reasonable cause to believe that Terry was
acting suspiciously and that some interrogation should be made.'
The Court held that if it were for his own protection, or the
protection of others, the detective had the right to pat down Terry's
outer clothing.39 The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed.' °
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and stated that the test
of whether a search and seizure was reasonable and thus
constitutional is
whether the officer's action was justified at its
inception and whether it was reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place .... [I]n justifying the
look right" to him. Id. at 5.
2 Id. at 6.
I01d.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 5.
2 Id. at 6.
I d. at 6, 7.
4 Id. at 7.
- Id.
'.State v. Chilton, 95 Ohio Op. 2d 489 (Cty, Ct. 1964), affd sub nom., State v.
Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966), aff d, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 State v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966), aff d, Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968).
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particular intrusion, the police officer must be able to
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion.
41
The facts known to the officer must be judged against an objective
standard or else "intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights
based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches" would
result.' Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that
the detective's actions did not violate Terry's Fourth Amendment
rights because the detective had "reasonable grounds to believe that
[Terry] was armed and dangerous, and it was necessary for the
protection of himself and others to take swift measures to discover
the true facts and neutralize the threat of harm if it materialized."
' 3
Terry expressed the Court's view that the Fourth Amendment
can be implicated even when a person is merely stopped and frisked
rather than technically arrested," but that a police officer who
reasonably believes that a person is armed has the authority to
search that person for a weapon even if the officer does not have
probable cause to make an arrest.' Yet, it should be noted that
Terry was fact-specific and the threat of physical harm to a police
officer or to the public was the foremost consideration of the
Court.' Nonetheless, the Terry principles are significant because
they have become the basis of review in drug courier profile cases.47
The reasonable suspicion exception to the Fourth Amendment
requirements, which permits police officers to frisk people suspected
of carrying weapons, has been extended to allow the police to stop
41 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968).
4 Id.
4 Id. at 30.
" Id. at 19 ("We therefore reject the notions that the Fourth Amendment does
not come into play at all as a limitation upon police conduct if the officers stop
short of something called a 'technical arrest' or a 'full-blown search."').
45 Id. at 27.
Id. at 30. "We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may
be armed and presently dangerous .... ." Id. (emphasis added).
' Terry principles comprised the foundation of the analysis of all drug courier
profile cases discussed in this note. See, e.g., Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980);
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
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people suspected of carrying drugs.'
II. THE SUPREME COURT DRUG COURIER PROFILE CASES
Beginning in 1980, the Supreme Court heard a series of cases
concerning the constitutionality of searches and seizures based upon
the display of characteristics contained in drug courier profiles.49
The Supreme Court concluded that such characteristics provide the
reasonable suspicion necessary to perform an investigatory stop.'
A. United States v. Mendenhall
DEA agents stationed at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport,
observed Mendenhall as she exited from a flight which landed in Los
Angeles.'1 Mendenhall was the last to leave the plane upon
arriving from a source city.52 The agents noted that she appeared
nervous and scanned the concourse area.' Mendenhall did not
claim any checked luggage and she changed airlines for her flight out
of Detroit.' The agents thought these characteristics indicated that
she was unlawfully carrying narcotics.'
The agents approached her, identified themselves and asked
to see her ticket and identification.' The confrontation revealed
that she was traveling under an assumed name and had been in
The majority in Terry stated:
[W]e are now concerned with more than the governmental
interest in investigating crime; in addition, there is the more
immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed
with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against him.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 23.
' United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491
(1983); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544 (1980).
5 Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9-10.
51 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547.
52 Id.
3 Id.
Id. at 547 n.1.
Id. at 547. The Court described the profile as an "informally compiled abstract
of characteristics thought typical of persons carrying illicit drugs." Id. at n.1.
% Id. at 547-48.
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California for only two days.' Mendenhall's ticket and
identification were returned to her and she'complied with the agents'
request that she accompany them to the DEA office inside the
airport. ' Inside the DEA office, Mendenhall consented to a search
of her handbag.59 She also consented to a strip search after being
informed "that if she were carrying no narcotics, there would be no
problem."'  The strip search revealed two small packages of
heroin.6'
At trial, Mendenhall moved to suppress admission of the
heroin.' The lower court held that the heroin was not suppressible
because the agents' conduct in their investigatory stop met the Terry
requirement that the stop be based upon "specific and articulable
facts that justified a suspicion of criminal activity."'  The court also
held that Mendenhall had voluntarily consented to the search and
that she was not seized until the heroin was found." The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, relying upon
United States v. McCaleb,6 which disapproved of the use of drug
courier profiles to provide a reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity was occurring.6
A divided Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit.67 Even
though the issue was not before the Court, the majority stated in
dicta that Mendenhall was not seized until she was arrested, because
until that point there was no physical force or show of authority
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 548.
5 Id.
Id. The facts do not state why Mendenhall consented to the search, only that
she "became quite shaken [and] extremely nervous" when approached by the
narcotics agent. Id.
60 Id. at 549.
61 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 549.
62 Id. at 547.
61 Id. at 549.
"Id.
552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1977).
"Id. at 720.
"Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 560. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun,
Powell, and Rehnquist joined in four parts (I, II-B, II-C, and III) of the opinion
written by Justice Stewart. Justice Rehnquist also joined in part II-A. Justice Powell
filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment which Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined. Justice White filed a dissent which
Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens joined.
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which restrained her freedom of movement.' The Court also found
that Mendenhall volunteered to go to the DEA office where she
freely gave her valid consent to the search of her handbag and
body.6
The dissenters took issue with the majority's consideration of
whether Mendenhall was seized on the airport's concourse, before
the search and arrest, in light of the fact that the trial court had
assumed that she had been.7 In his dissent, Justice White opined
that Mendenhall was seized when the agents stopped her on the
concourse and took her ticket and identification.' In support of
this argument was testimony by an agent at trial. He stated that
after he had asked Mendenhall to accompany him to the DEA office,
he would have stopped her from walking away if she had tried to do
so.
72
Additionally, the dissenters were ,unpersuaded by the
government's argument that MendenhaU's behavior was suspicious
solely because it was consistent with the criteria contained within a
drug courier profile.' They found her conduct to be totally
consistent with "behavior that could reasonably be expected of
anyone changing planes in an airport terminal. '74
In Mendenhall, the Court did not reach the issue of whether
the display of behavior consistent with profile characteristics
automatically satisfied reasonable suspicion requirement.m  As
Professor Cloud states, "[t]he Justices merely accepted government
claims that the defendant's conduct was consistent with the
profile."'76 Law enforcement officials could thus create a profile to
match the behavior of a randomly selected traveler and have the
6 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553.
Id. at 557-58.
Id. at 565 (White, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens
joined the dissent.
7'Id. at 569.
72Id. at 575 n.12.
73 Id. at 572.
7' Id.
7 This point was not explicitly discussed by the majority. The majority found
that the dispositive issue was whether or not Mendenhall consented to the search.
It was assumed, that the agents were justified in stopping Mendenhall in the first
place.
76 Cloud, supra note 1, at 864.
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requisite reasonable suspicion to stop that traveller."
B. Reid v. Georgia
Reid displayed several of the same characteristics as
Mendenhall had exhibited. However, the Supreme Court, in a per
curiam decision, found this to be insufficient to constitute reasonable
suspicion.'
After arriving on a flight from Ft. Lauderdale, Reid and a
companion were followed by DEA agents through the Atlanta
Airport.' It appeared that the two were attempting to conceal the
fact that they were traveling together.8' Reid and his companion
carried matching shoulder bags and had no checked baggage.' As
they left the terminal, a DEA agent stopped them and asked for their
tickets and identification. 2 The agents noted that the two appeared
nervous and that they had been in Florida for only one day.' The
pair agreed to return to the terminal with the agents to be searched,
but as the group entered the terminal, Reid ran away, abandoning
his shoulder bag in the process.8" Reid was captured and cocaine
was found in the discarded bag.'
The trial court granted Reid's motion to suppress admission
of the cocaine concluding that based upon what the DEA agent
observed "the cocaine . . .had been obtained . ..without an
articulable suspicion that he was unlawfully carrying illicit drugs."'
The Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed.87 It stated that the drug
courier profile match, along with the fact that Reid attempted to get
away and the abandonment of his bag, provided the necessary
77 id.
' Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438,441 (1980) (per curiam) ("We conclude that the
agent could not, as a matter of law, have reasonably suspected the petitioner of
criminal activity on the basis of these observed circumstances.").
7 Id. at 439.
'Id.
81 Id.82 id.
' Reid, 448 U.S. at 439.
" Id.
8 Id.
6Id.
s' State v. Reid, 255 S.E.2d 71 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979), vacated sub nom., Reid v.
Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980).
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reasonable suspicion.'
The Supreme Court reversed the Georgia Court of
Appeals." The Court concluded that the agents could not have
reasonably suspected Reid of criminal activity on the basis of what
they had observed.' What the agents observed "could describe a
very large category of presumably innocent travelers."'' According
to the Court, sanctioning the DEA action would provide the DEA
free reign to seize randomly innocent passengers because of a mere
hunch.9
Furthermore, the Court rejected the contention that merely
deplaning in Atlanta, trying to appear to be alone, checking no
baggage and carrying a shoulder bag were cause enough for a person
to be stopped by the DEA.r Unlike in Mendenhall, the Court
actually analyzed the behavior observed by the agents and decided
that it was simply too common to constitute reasonable suspicion."
The Court refused to assume that the agents were justified in initially
stopping the traveler."
C. Florida v. Royer
Following Reid, the Supreme Court continued to struggle with
drug courier profiles. For a three year period, the Court was not
presented with the question of whether the exhibition of drug courier
profile characteristics establishes reasonable suspicion. Then, in 1983,
the Court decided Florida v. Royer.'
In January of 1978, two local police officers were assigned to
Miami International Airport to observe passengers.' The officers'
attention was drawn to Royer because he matched the drug courier
profile:
(a) [He] was carrying American Tourister luggage,
Id. at 7i.
Reid, 448 U.S. at 442.
90 Id. at 441.
91 Id.
92 id.
93 id.
"Reid, 448 U.S. at 441.
9sId.
9460 U.S. 491 (1983).
"Id. at 493.
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which appeared to be heavy, (b) he was young,
apparently between the ages of 25 and 35, (c) he was
casually dressed, (d) he appeared pale and nervous,
looking around at other people, (e) he paid for his
[one-way] ticket [to New York City] in cash with a
large number of bills, and (f) rather than completing
the airline identification tag to be attached to checked
baggage, which had space for a name, address and
telephone number, he wrote only a name and
destination."
As Royer approached the boarding area the detectives
confronted him." Although his ticket was in an assumed name,
Royer produced that ticket and his driver's license when asked.1"'
At that point, Royer was informed that he was suspected of
transporting narcotics."1 The detectives did not return Royer's
ticket and identification to him, but asked that he accompany them
to an office in the airport; Royer complied."~ Without Royer's
consent, the detectives retrieved his luggage from the airline."~
Royer consented to the police opening his suitcases. Inside, the
detectives found marijuana."4
The trial court refused to suppress admission of the
marijuana, finding that Royer had "freely and voluntarily" consented
to the search."~ The Court of Appeal of Florida reversed Royer's
conviction, stating that Royer's consent was invalid because it was
obtained while he was involuntarily confined." Royer was in a
very small room with two police officers, his ticket and identification
had been taken and he had been told that he was suspected of
trafficking illegal drugs."7 The court reasoned that this was far
more than a brief investigatory stop requiring only reasonable
s Id. at 493 n.2.
Id. at 494.
100 Id.
1-1 Reid, 460 U.S. at 494.
" Id. The "office" was described as a large closet. Id.
10 Id.
104 Id. at 494-95.
105 Id. at 495.
106 Royer v. State, 389 So. 2d 1007, 1014 (Fla. Ct. App. 1979), affd sub nom.,
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
'7 Id. at 1018.
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suspicion to be valid." This was a seizure requiring probable
cause which the detectives admitted they did. not have."
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 opinion, affirmed the Florida
Court of Appeal."' The Court stated that the Fourth Amendment
requires that a search, whether warrantless or not, must be
reasonable as to the place, and person to be searched."' An
investigative stop "must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop""' 2 and the means
used to stop should be the least intrusive methods available. 3
Since the Florida detectives' conduct did not adhere to these
standards, any consent given by Royer was invalid."" The Court
further stated that although the facts known to the detectives at the
time they stopped Royer were adequate grounds for temporarily
detaining him, these grounds did not amount to probable cause."15
To find otherwise, the Court stated, "every nervous young man
paying cash for a ticket to New York City under an assumed name
and carrying two heavy American Tourister bags" would be subject
to arrest."6
Only Justice Brennan thought that the characteristics
displayed by Royer did not establish reasonable suspicion.17 The
majority found behavior matching the characteristics of a drug
courier profile to be sufficient to establish the reasonable suspicion
required for an investigatory stop."8 No analysis of the validity or
predictive value of the characteristics was discussed. This seems a
direct contradiction to Reid, which was decided only three years
'01 Id. at 1018-19.
'" Id. 1019-20.
110 Royer, 460 U.S. at 499.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 500.
113 Id.
114 Id.
"I Royer, 460 U.S. at 501, 507.
116 Id. at 507.
"' Id. at 512 (Brennan, J., concurring).
118 Id. at 502 ("When the officers discovered that Royer was traveling under an
assumed name ... paying cash for a one-way ticket, [his] mode of checking the
two bags, and [his] appearance and conduct in general - [they had] adequate
grounds for suspecting Royer of carrying drugs ....").
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earlier."9 The Court failed to define the profile's characteristics or
to decide the number of characteristics necessary to justify a
seizure. 2' Once again, the Court failed to demand proof of the
profile's validity or evidence demonstrating the basis for including
each of the characteristics in the profile.21 As a result, after issuing
ten separate opinions in three different cases, the Supreme Court
Justices have left unresolved the problems central to understanding
the relationship of the drug courier profile to the Fourth
Amendment." Royer, however, is perceived as "a strong warning
to law enforcement officers not to transform a brief stop for
investigation into a forced interrogation or arrest."' 3
D. United States v. Sokolow
United States v. Sokolow'24 is the most recent Supreme Court
decision to analyze the constitutionality of drug courier profiles."2
In Sokolow, the Court directly addressed the issue of the relationship
between the drug courier profile and reasonable suspicion.126
DEA agents stopped Sokolow in the Honolulu International
Airport because he paid for his ticket to Miami with twenty dollar
bills, traveled under a name that did not match the name under
which his telephone was listed, stayed in Miami only forty-eight
hours, appeared nervous during his trip, and checked none of his
luggage.127 The agents confronted Sokolow as he tried to hail a
cab." As is common in drug courier profile stops, the agents
119 Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980), was decided in June, 1980. Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), was decided in March, 1983.
',, Cloud, supra note 1, at 869.
121 id.
122 Id.
1" Barbara J. Lorence, Note, Drug Courier Profiles, 28 DuQ. L. REV. 809, 828
(1990).
124 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
125 Id.
126 Id. at 11. The Court stated that "[a] court sitting to determine the existence
of reasonable suspicion must require the agent to articulate the factors leading to
that conclusion, but the fact that these factors may be set forth in a 'profile' does
not somehow detract from their evidentiary significance as seen by a trained
agent." Id. at 10.
1 Id. at 3. The majority also mentions that Sokolow wore a black jumpsuit and
gold jewelry and had a medium size Louis Vuitton bag. Id. at 4, 5.
1 Id. at 5.
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realized that the suspect was traveling under an assumed name after
checking his ticket and identification.129 Sokolow was escorted to
a DEA office in the airport where a narcotics-detecting dog signaled
the presence of cocaine in Sokolow's shoulder bag.'-' The agents
then arrested Sokolow and obtained a warrant to search his bag,
however, the bag did not contain any illicit drugs.'31 The dog then
alerted the agents to the presence of drugs in a second bag.1
32
Because it was too late in the day to obtain a warrant, the agents
released Sokolow, but kept his bag."3 The next day a warrant was
obtained and 1,063 grams of cocaine were found in the second
bag. 3
4
The district court refused to suppress admission of the
cocaine, finding that the agents had reasonable suspicion to stop
Sokolow at the airport."3 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit devised a two-part test for such cases and reversed the
district court decision"3 The test divides the facts bearing on
suspicion into two categories. The first category contains facts "that
bear some reasonable correlation to a suspicion of ongoing criminal
activity but also 'describe a very large category of presumably
innocent travelers.'0 37  These facts alone cannot sustain a
reasonable suspicion, they must be accompanied by facts in the
second category." The second category contains facts about "the
'particular conduct' of the defendant and the 'particularized evidence
must raise suspicions of ongoing (or recently completed) criminal
activity."' 39 For example, the court placed traveling under an alias
and evasive movements in the second category." These elements
12 Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 5.
130 id.
131 id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
13 id.
" United States v. Sokolow, No. 86-762, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3435 (S.D.N.Y.
May 4, 1987).
13 United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir. 1987).
3 Id. at 1419.
1 3 Id. at 1421.
139 id.
140 Id. at 1419 ("Traveling under an alias or evasive movements are part of the
performance of the crime. These elements of the profile demonstrate behavior that,
absent unusual circumstances, reasonably may demonstrate an ongoing crime.").
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are consistent with ongoing criminal activity unless explained by
unusual circumstances."' Appearing to be nervous, arriving from
a source city, and time of flight were provided by the court as
examples of first category elements." These elements describe
many passengers not involved in the drug trade and by themselves
indicate no "ongoing criminal enterprise."'" Such factors are
relevant only "if there [is] evidence of ongoing criminal behavior and
the Government offered 'empirical documentation' that the
combination of facts at issue did not describe the behavior of
'significant numbers of innocent persons.' 144 Applying this test to
the facts, the court found Sokolow's stop to be impermissible.'"
All of the facts offered by the government fell into the first category
and they did not indicate ongoing criminal behavior.'"
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the approach
advanced by the court of appeals as creating "unnecessary difficulty"
in dealing with a simple concept.147 Instead, the Court put forth a
very simple "totality of the circumstances" standard.'" Applying
this standard, the Court held that while each fact known to the DEA
agents on its own did not prove any illegal conduct, taken together,
they amounted to reasonable suspicion.149
Justice Marshall's dissent stated that "nothing about the
characteristics shown by airport traveler Sokolow reasonably suggests
that criminal activity is afoot."'" Justice Marshall also noted that
the reasonable suspicion standard requires specific and articulable
facts which the agents here did not have. 5' Justice Marshall also
pointed out the shortcomings of the profile. For example, he stated
that "drug couriers will adapt their behavior to sidestep detection
Id.
'4' Sokolow, 831 F.2d at 1419.
142Id. at 1420.
143 Id.
14 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 6 (1989) (quoting Sokolow, 831 F.2d at
1420).
14 Sokolow, 831 F.2d at 1423.
146 Id.
14 Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7.
' Id. at 8.
"9 Id. at 9.
" Id. at 17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
151 Id. at 12.
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[by] profile-focused officers."152 He further noted that the profile's
chameleon-like tendency to adjust itself to fit the circumstances
would foster unwarranted police harassment due to reflexive
reliance, by police officers, on a profile instead of case-by-case police
work. 3 He concluded by lamenting that "when drug crimes or
anti-drug policies are at issue, [the majority is too willing] to give
short shrift to constitutional rights."'54
In Sokolow, the Supreme Court held that while exhibiting
behaviors contained in a drug courier profile does not alone
constitute reasonable suspicion, these same behaviors considered
within the totality of the circumstances may be sufficient to establish
the requisite reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop.'o The
test devised by the Ninth Circuit required an overly meticulous
analysis and classification of each profile characteristic observed."
However, the mere statement by law enforcement officers that a
certain characteristic is indicative of criminal conduct would not
unquestionably be accepted.5 7 Yet, the Court did not provide any
guidance as to how innocent behaviors can be combined to provide
reasonable suspicion or what it is about the total circumstances that
taint innocent behavior. Undoubtedly these issues have been left to
the lower courts to struggle with on a case-by-case basis.
III. THE SOKOLOW AFrERMATH
Sokolow has not stemmed the flow of profile cases."S  A
sampling of post-Sokolow lower court profile cases reveals that the
decision has not provided much guidance. Cases concerning
reasonable suspicion and the use of illegal alien profiles at the United
152 Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 13 n.1.
15 Id. at 13.
'5' Id. at 17.
"5 Id. at 8.
156 Id.
1" Id. ("[These characteristics] do not have the sort of iron clad significance
attributed to them by the Court of Appeals.").
I See United States v. Carrasquillo, 877 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States
v. Battista, 876 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States v. Montilla, 733 F. Supp. 579
(W.D.N.Y. 1990); State v. Maldonado, 793 P.2d 1138 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); Lowery
v. Commonwealth of Va., 388 S.E.2d 265 (Va. Ct. App. 1990); City of St. Paul v.
Uber, 450 N.W.2d 623 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); People v. Sosbe, 789 P.2d 1113 (Colo.
1990); State v. Johnson, 561 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 1990).
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States-Mexico border, drug courier profiles on the highways and in
bus stations, and profiles of prostitutes' clients on the city streets
have resulted in ad hoc decisions that do not require law
enforcement officers to justify profile contents.'59
A. A Border Patrol Stop
In State v. Maldonado,"W the Court of Appeals of Arizona
upheld the suppression of the marijuana found in a car stopped by
the border patrol on Interstate Ten. 6' Using an illegal alien profile,
patrolmen stopped a 1977 Buick because it had wide passenger and
trunk space, the vehicle was clean, the passengers appeared to be of
Hispanic descent and were acting nervous, they wore western-style
clothing, the driver and passenger did not talk to each other, and
they failed to make eye contact with the patrolmen.' 62 According
to the court, a permissible stop is "based upon 'particularized' or
'founded' suspicion by the officer and that the officer must state an
'articulable' reason for the stop.""3 The test for a permissible stop
is two-fold.' First, all of the circumstances, the officer's subjective
observations, as well as objective factors, must be taken into
consideration.'" Second, the assessment of the circumstances must
"raise a justifiable suspicion that the particular individual to be
detained is involved in criminal activity."' 66 This profile stop failed
the test because there was no particularized suspicion about
Maldonado;' 67 the patrolmen stopped him on a hunch.'"
The two-pronged test used in Arizona is a restatement of the
Sokolow test.69 In comparing this set of circumstances to those in
'" See infra notes 160-211 and accompanying text.
160 793 P.2d 1138 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
161 Id. at 1139.
'62 id. at 1139-40. As to the state of the car, one patrolman stated that dirty cars
can also fit the profile they used. He also admitted to stopping people who made
eye contact with the officers. Id. at 1140.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Maldonaldo, 793 P.2d at 1140 (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1
(1989)).
16 id. at 1141.
165Id.
"9 See supra notes 135-46 and accompanying text.
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Sokolow, it is clear that the type of information the patrolmen
possessed concerning Maldonado does not approach the type of
information the DEA agents had concerning Sokolow.'" The DEA
agents knew Sokolow had only spent two days in Miami, they knew
he paid for a $2,100 ticket using twenty dollar bills and they knew
that the telephone number he gave the airline was listed under a
different name." The information the border patrol possessed
concerning Maldonado is more akin to the information the DEA
agents had concerning Reid."r  The border patrol stopped
Maldonaldo on a hunch or "good bet."" This is not reasonable
suspicion under the law."4
B. Highway Drug Courier Profile Stops
Florida Highway Patrolman Vogel developed his own drug
courier profile even though the Florida Highway Patrol had other
standards."5  The Vogel profile contained the following
characteristics: a large model car driven early in the morning on
Interstate 95 with only one occupant, a male driver, casually dressed,
about thirty years old, out of state license plates and an overly
cautious driver taking care not to exceed the speed limit."76
One morning, Johnson drove past Vogel's post and drew
Vogel's attention." Johnson was driving a large car north at 4:15
a.m. on Interstate 95.1'8 The car had Maryland plates and was
traveling exactly at the speed limit.19 Vogel stopped Johnson and
found marijuana in the car."8
17o See supra notes 127-34 and accompanying text.
"''United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989).
17 See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
'm State v. Maldonaldo, 793 P.2d 1138, 1141 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
174 Id.
's State v. Johnson, 561 So. 2d 1139, 1140-41 (Fla. 1990). Vogel developed his
personal profile based upon thirty arrests he made between March 5, 1984 and
April 18, 1985. The Florida Highway Patrol profile included the presence of air
shocks on a car, blacked-out glass, and evidence that the car was heavily loaded.
Vogel did not rely upon the Patrol's profile. Id. at 1141.
1'76 Id. at 1140.
177 Id.
18 Id.
17 Johnson, 561 P.2d at 1140.
180 Id.
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The Florida Supreme Court suppressed admission of the
marijuana using a test which it claimed the Sokolow decision
supported.'81 The court required "a strong and articulable link - a
'rational inference' - between the sequence of acts observed by the
police and the concealed criminal conduct believed to exist, whether
or not this sequence is described as a 'profile.""'82  The court
criticized the Vogel profile as failing to describe any unusual
behavior not also innocently exhibited by a large segment of the
population."8 The Vogel profile seemed so arbitrary that the court
feared future profiles would be established based on sex, race, ethnic
background or religion.'M
This author has no doubt that the Florida court reached the
correct conclusion, but the door is still wide open for more profile
cases. The characteristics sought out by Patrolman Vogel sweep too
broadly."8 Serious questions still remain as to what would be the
correct set of characteristics and how they are to be proven in a court
of law.
Five months prior to Johnson, the Virginia State Police
Department utilized a drug courier profile that attached suspicion to
black and Latino males driving Florida rental cars northward.186
Lowery was stopped and marijuana was found in his car.8 7 While
the Virginia Court of Appeals upheld Lowery's stop, it reasoned that
using race as a profile characteristic was unconstitutional.' The
court stated that
it is unreasonable for the police to consider the
181 Id. at 1142.
182 Id. at 1143.
'" Id. at 114243. The court was cognizant of the fact that Vogel's profile had
been rejected on two separate occasions by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986) and
United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546 (11th Cir. 1987). Johnson, 561 So. 2d at 1141.
18 Johnson, 561 So. 2d at 1143.
Quoting the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the
Supreme Court of Florida reiterated that Trooper Vogel's list of factors is nothing
but "nondistinguishing characteristics." Id. at 1141.
1" Lowery v. Commonwealth of Va., 388 S.E.2d 265-66 (Va. Ct. App. 1990).
18 Id. at 266.
18 Id. at 267. The state trooper knew that local Florida leasing companies do
not permit their cars to be driven out of the state, so the trooper had the reasonable
suspicion necessary to stop Lowery upon seeing this car being driven in the state
of Virginia. Id. at 266, 268.
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apparent race or national origin of the suspect as a
factor determining whether, in a particular case, there
is reason or probable cause to believe that the suspect
is trafficking in drugs, except when used to describe
a previously identified suspect.'" 9
The Virginia court did not mention Sokolow in its decision. The court
held that race was not a valid factor in deciding whether to stop
travelers on the highways, but that a rental car heading north was a
valid factor.
C. The Drug Courier Profile in a Bus Station
The express bus from New York City to Niagara, New York,
is thought by the DEA to be a major conduit of narcotics into the
upstate area." DEA agents regularly monitor activity at the
Niagara station." The profile used draws the agent's attention to
people alighting from the express bus carrying duffel bags." Other
profile characteristics include appearing nervous and walking quickly
through the station.' 3
In United States v. Montilla,'" the defendant exhibited these
characteristics, and he and his companion changed direction as they
approached a DEA agent, in the bus station.195 In determining
whether all the circumstances justified Montilla's stop, the court
evaluated the worth of each characteristic." Using this approach,
the court found the stop to be illegal."'' The characteristics relied
upon by the agents were also exhibited by many passengers who did
not transport illegal drugs.'"
Interestingly, the Montilla court found "[t]he information
available was not sufficient to consider that the defendants met a
1I9 ld. at 267.
' See United States v. Montilla, 733 F. Supp. 579, 580 (W.D.N.Y. 1990).
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 id.
194 Id. at 579.
19 Montilla, 733 F. Supp. at 581.
196 Id.
Id. at 584.
1" Id. at 582-83.
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drug courier profile."'" Arguably, the court was passing judgment
on the profile used by the DEA in the Niagara bus station. It
remains unclear which characteristics, if any, the Montilla court
would consider essential to a drug courier profile. In addition, from
United States v. Sokolow,7 there is no indication that the Supreme
Court approved of such an individual evaluation of each
characteristic to determine whether it is suggestive of criminal
conduct.
D. A Profile to Spot the Clients of Prostitutes
Stephen Uber lives in a St. Paul suburb, but was observed
twice within a thirty minute time span, by the St. Paul vice squad,
circling a particular block within the city. 1 Uber was looking for
an address in a part of town that was unfamiliar to him.' Uber
was stopped by the police because he fit the profile of a person
looking for a prostitute.2' He was traveling alone at a late hour,
he had been seen twice by the officer within a very short time
period, and the vehicle check revealed that he had an out-of-the-area
address.' Upon stopping Uber, the police discovered that his
driver's license had expired.2
In finding Uber's stop to be invalid, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals distinguished the facts known to the vice squad at the time
Uber was stopped from those known by the DEA when Sokolow was
stopped.' The appeals court concluded that the facts before it did
not in any way approach the information available to the DEA.'
Every item in the vice squad's profile could be invalidated by a
common sense explanation.' Uber had been randomly
stopped.' The officers knew of no articulable facts that suggested
'"Id. at 584.
0 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
City of St. Paul v. Uber, 450 N.W.2d 623, 624 (Minn. 1990).
Id. at 625.
V3 Id.
2 Id.
2M Id.
' Uber, 450 N.W.2d at 626.
27 Id. at 626-27.
W Id.
20 Id. at 629.
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criminal activity may have been occurring.210
This case seems to be a clear example of the "'overbearing or
harassing' police conduct carried out solely on the basis of imprecise
stereotypes of what criminals look like, or on the basis of irrelevant
personal characteristics such as race""11 that Justice Marshall feared
would occur as a result of the Sokolow decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is clear that the widespread availability of illegal drugs has
lead to some very serious problems in our country. Law enforcement
attempts to curtail the flow- of illegal drugs into and around the
country are, of course, admirable. Nevertheless, the use of drug
courier profiles for this purpose infringes upon the Fourth
Amendment rights of all'citizens, whether they are actual drug
couriers or innocent travelers.
212
The troubling aspects of drug courier profiles, discussed by
Justice Marshall in his dissent to the Sokolow decision, cannot be
ignored.213 The potential for abuse is clear when individual law
enforcement agents are able to develop profiles based upon what
they personally have observed. 214 These personal profiles could be
used to harass and/or detain certain segments of the population
regardless of the intent of the agent.215 This has already occurred
210 Id. at 626.
211 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 12 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2 Statistics concerning the success of the drug courier profile program at the
Detroit airport are as follows: during the first 18 months of operation, 141 persons
in 96 encounters were searched; illegal drugs were found in 77 of the encounters
and 122 people were arrested; 19 innocent travelers were stopped and subjected to
a search only because their behavior coincided with that contained in a profile that
has not been subjected to close scrutiny. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
562 (1980).
23 See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
21 See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 561 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 1990) (Trooper ignored a
profile developed by the Florida Highway Patrol which included the presence of
airshocks, blacked out glass, and evidence that the car was heavily loaded, and
replaced it with a profile he personally developed which included the apparent age
of the driver, the gender of the driver, the driver's clothing, and the fact that the
car did not exceed the speed limit. The trooper testified that he had no record of
the number of cars he stopped which he decided not to search or those he searched
and failed to find contraband). Id. at 114041 n.2.
215 Id.
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in Florida.216 Motorists have been stopped and searched because
they exhibited innocent traits which the highway patrolman
personally felt were indicative of trafficking in illegal drugs.217
While the court rightfully refused to approve the use of this profile,
it nevertheless neglected to discuss the required evidence or proof
that would guide the police in devising profiles.218
The possibility of race being used as a profile characteristic
is frightening, but real. A law enforcement agent probably would
not admit to using race as a factor even though he or she actually
did."9 It is also possible that race could be one fragment of the
"totality of the circumstances" which the court may consider. 2
The chameleon-like aspect of the profile might encourage law
officers to testify falsely that the traits exhibited by a suspect were
the traits contained in the profile utilized.' The profiles are
undocumented and confidential and the courts are not absolutely
certain what they contain. This has lead to inconsistencies which cast
a shadow of doubt over their reliability. For example, the first
person to deplane may be suspicious to one agent.m Another
agent might find the last person to deplane to be suspicious.' And
still another agent might find that the person exiting in the middle
26 See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text. The patrolman could have
included in his profile any element common to the arrests he had previously made,
such as religion, race, or nationality. Johnson, 561 So. 2d at 1140.
217 Id. at 1141.
28 The test devised by the Florida court requires "a strong and articulable link -
'a rational inference'- between the sequence of acts observed by the police and the
concealed criminal conduct believed to exist, whether or not this sequence is
described as a 'profile."' Id. at 1143.
219 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,885-87 (1975) (holding that
ethnicity alone cannot supply reasonable suspicion); see also Sheri L. Johnson, Race
and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 225 (1983) (setting forth that
"courts often allow [race] to tip the scales of probable cause").
' The "totality of the circumstances" test supported by the Sokolow majority
calls for considering all the factors - "the whole picture" - known to the police
officers when they decided to stop a suspect. The majority did not state whether
there were any factors which could not be included. United States v. Sokolow, 490
U.S. 1, 8 (1989).
21 The characteristics contained in drug courier profiles are usually kept
confidential. In various cases, law enforcement officers have testified to conflicting
characteristics which comprise the profiles they use. Id. at 13 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
22 United States v. Moore, 675 F.2d 802-03 (6th Cir. 1987).
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 564 (1980).
of the crowd should be stopped and questioned. 4
Profile cases must be decided on a case-by-case basis, relying
very heavily on the particular facts before the court. This approach
provides very little guidance for law enforcement agencies and
subsequent judges. The courts seem to know which characteristics
do not provide reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, but they are
apparently unclear as to the characteristics that do provide it and
when.' The courts appear to use the facts of Sokolow and Royer
as benchmarks. 6  They compare the facts of those cases to the
facts before it. If the facts that strongly suggested criminal behavior
in Sokolow and Royer are present, such as using an alias or providing
an incorrect telephone number, the court will probably uphold the
validity of the stop as being based upon reasonable suspicion.227
The Sokolow decision tends to favor the police as opposed to
the detainees.' If the police can show that all the circumstances
were considered and that profile characteristics were only a portion
of the entire circumstances, the profile use would probably be
sustained.29 This is because the courts generally do not ask for
proof that the traits in a profile indicate criminal behavior.' As
one commentator has stated, "[t]o give an officer the power to detain
individuals merely because they act in concert with a series of
characteristics thought to be common to drug couriers is to take a
long step down the road to unbridled police power. '0 31
The method devised by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
*' See United States v. Buenaventur-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1980).
21 The Court in Sokolow stated that paying $2,100 in cash for airline tickets and
traveling twenty hours from Honolulu to Miami in July for a forty-eight hour visit
are factors which standing alone do not warrant suspicion, but are sufficient to
warrant consideration. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 3 (1989).
22 "[Tlhe facts in Sokolow unmistakably support a rational inference of
wrongdoing." State v. Johnson, 561 So. 2d 1139, 1142 (Fla. 1990). In Carrasquillo,
each fact known to the police was compared to each fact known to the officers in
Royer. United States v. Carrasquillo, 877 F.2d 73, 77-78 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citing
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)).
W Carrasquillo, 877 F.2d at 77.
2" Law enforcement agents are not required to prove the validity of each
element of their profiles. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7-9.
29 Id.
' The majority in Sokolow stated that analyzing each element of a profile by
itself (as the court of appeals had when it reviewed the case) was "not in keeping
with the quoted statements from [its] decisions." Id. at 8.
221 Greene & Wice, supra note 9, at 284.
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Circuit and rejected by the majority in Sokolow seems to be a better
approach. It attempts to look at the facts initiating police activity
from an objective standpoint. A fact either describes "ongoing
criminal activity" or a "personal characteristic" which may be
displayed by a drug courier or the public at large 32 A "personal
characteristic" must always be accompanied by at least one fact
describing "ongoing criminal activity" to create reasonable
suspicion.' This method requires a little bit more work on the
part of judges, but it also sets guideposts which can be used by law
enforcement officials and, of course, courts. In the small sampling of
post-Sokolow cases analyzed, the courts might in reality be using this
method instead of or in conjunction with "the totality of the
circumstances." In United States v. Montilla, the court failed to find
that the profile provided reasonable suspicion because the facts
considered by the authorities were consistent with innocent
behavior33' In reaching this conclusion, the court analyzed each
individual fact and characterized it as either indicative of criminal
conduct or a personal characteristic without meaning.33 The courts
may also be devising their own tests, which they find less vague and
amorphous than the Sokolow standard.' 6 The broad expansion of
profile usage could well result in the unfettered discretion of law
enforcement officers to stop who they please when they please. Such
unbridled police conduct clashes with the concepts of liberty most
Americans take for granted.
Denise A. Michaux
United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d at 1413, 1419 (9th Cir. 1987).
3 Id.
United States v. Montilla, 733 F. Supp. 579, 584 (W.D.N.Y. 1990).
23 "But to determine whether all of the circumstances justify the stop, the worth
of each factor should be considered." Id. at 582 (going further than the simple
Sokolow "totality of the circumstances" approach).
' See State v. Maldonado, 793 P.2d 1138 (Ariz. App. 1990); see also State v.
Johnson, 561 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 1990).
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